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Abstract 
Observational determinism is a security property that characterizes secure information flow for multithreaded 
programs. Most of the methods that have been used to verify observational determinism are based on either type 
systems or conventional model checking techniques. A conventional model checker is stateful and often verifies a 
system model usually constructed manually. As these methods are based on stateful model checking, they are 
confronted with the state space explosion problem. In order to verify and test computer programs, stateless code 
model checking is more appropriate than conventional techniques. It is an effective method for systematic testing of 
large and complicated concurrent programs, and for exploring the state space of such programs.  In this paper, we 
propose a new method for verifying information flow security in concurrent programs. For the first time, we use 
stateless code model checking to verify observational determinism.  
Keywords: Information flow security, observational determinism, stateless code model checking, software 
verification, concurrent programs.  
1. Introduction 
Confidentiality is a key feature of computer applications such as Internet banking and authentication 
systems. Private data in such systems should be protected strictly. The key idea is that secret information 
should not be derivable from public data [1]. In a multi-level security system, data is processed in 
different security levels. In a scenario with two security levels, the low level is equal to public data and 
the high level is equal to private data. One security property of a program with a multi-level security 
policy is that information from a specified security level must not flow to a lower level [2]. The notion of 
information flow security is usually based on the non-interference property [3]. Non-interference is a 
model of the multi-level security policy, which intuitively means private data will not affect public data 
[4]. This property confirms that sensitive information is kept hidden while the program is running. It 
guarantees the initial values of the private variables have no effect on the final values of the public 
                                                     
* Corresponding author. Address: School of Computer Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Hengam St., Resalat Sq., 
Tehran, Iran, Postal Code: 16846-13114, Fax: +98-21-73021480, E-mail: azgomi@iust.ac.ir. 
Technical Report No. TWcL-TR-1401, Trustworthy Computing Laboratory, School of Computer Engineering, 
Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran, 2014. 
 
2 
 
 
variables [2, 5].  
In the literature, it has been a perennial challenge to verify information flow security in concurrent 
programs. There is a lot of work on enforcing information flow security using type systems at the 
compiler level. Recently, it has been tried to deal with dynamic concepts of programs in type systems, 
but, because of the static nature, all the related work in this area has taken a restrictive approach. Static 
techniques have difficulty enforcing information flow security policies into concurrent programs. One of 
these difficulties is non-deterministic thread scheduling [6]. Information flow security depends on the 
scheduling policy in concurrent programs. A program which is secure under a particular scheduler may 
not be secure under another scheduler [6, 7]. 
Generally speaking, model checking [8, 9] is a promising method for detecting and debugging deep 
concurrency-related errors [9-11]. Most of the existing model checkers are stateful or/and model-based. 
We refer to these tools as conventional model checkers. In other words, conventional model checking 
includes stateful and model-based techniques. In several studies, such as [2, 5], model checking methods 
were employed to verify information flow security. However, all of them used conventional model 
checking techniques to verify an abstract core of a simple imperative language. In addition, most work in 
this area has concentrated on verifying sequential programs (such as [2, 12]). It is suited to verify 
information flow security via model checking [8], but the problem with this approach is that conventional 
model checkers are rather inappropriate to verify realistic and large programs. 
A stateful model checker systematically explores the whole state space of a given system saving all the 
visited states, and then verifies the system by using the captured states. In order to use a model-based 
model checker, the user usually has to manually model the target system and give it as input to the model 
checker. So the validity of the verification result relies on that model, hence it is necessary that the input 
model conform to the target code. Users are usually expected to formally specify the system properties. 
Then, the model checker verifies whether the constructed model satisfies the specified properties [9].  
In the late 1990s, “code model checking” or “software model checking” emerged as a new trend in the 
model checking field. This approach is more appropriate for the software world because it makes it 
possible for users to verify their systems without having to manually model them [13, 14]. Code model 
checkers, such as JPF [15], GMC [16], CHESS [17], and SLAM [18], verify programs code directly [11, 
14]. These tools may be either stateful or stateless (however, it is possible for a code model checker to 
apply a combination of these methods). Code model checkers may be model-based; i.e. they try to 
automatically extract an abstract model from code and explore the state space of the extracted model.  
Although stateful tools are powerful enough to verify sequential programs, they usually encounter the 
state space explosion problem during verification of parallel programs. Due to saving all the state space, 
when the concurrency level rises, we will face more complexity, and the state space will grow 
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exponentially [9]. This is where stateless code model checking comes into use. This method does not 
need to save any program states. It is particularly suited to explore the state space of large programs, 
because precisely capturing all the essential states of a large program could be a daunting task [10, 19]. 
The global variables, heap, thread stacks, and register contexts are only parts of one state of a running 
program. Even if all the states of a program could be captured, processing such large states would be very 
expensive [10, 20]. 
In this paper, we propose a new method for verifying non-interference in concurrent programs. The 
proposed method uses stateless code model checking (instead of conventional techniques) to 
automatically verify observational determinism [7, 21, 22]. Observational determinism is a definition of 
non-interference for concurrent programs. The main contribution of this paper is to apply stateless code 
model checking to verifying observational determinism. As yet, several formal definitions have been 
proposed for observational determinism. However, it is still a challenge to practically verify 
observational determinism property despite its theoretical power.  Some of the stateless model checking 
techniques, such as [10, 23-27], have demonstrated the power of stateless model checking to verify large 
and real-world programs. Seeking to find an effective verification method, we have decided to use 
stateless code model checking for this purpose. 
One of the most important contributions of this paper is that observational determinism is checked on 
single traces instead of two traces as in the literature based on the technique of self-composition. 
Additionally, the method proposed in the paper can be used for detecting trace stutter equivalence in real-
world concurrent programs, which could have useful applications. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some background on stateless 
code model checking and the formal definitions used in the paper. This section describes the concept of 
observational determinism as well. Section 3 presents our method for verifying observational 
determinism. Section 4 surveys and discusses the related work on information flow security. Finally, 
Section 5 mentions some concluding remarks as well as avenues for future work. 
2. Preliminaries 
This section presents the formal background for this paper. The first subsection briefly introduces 
stateless code model checking. The second subsection states some of the required formal definitions. 
Finally, the last subsection formally defines observational determinism and its related concepts. 
2.1. Stateless Code Model Checking 
Stateless model checking is a useful state space exploration technique for systematically testing of 
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complex real-world software [10, 19, 28]. The notion of stateless model checking was proposed 
simultaneously with the appearance of code model checking by Godefroid in [19].  
A stateless model checker explores the state space of a program without capturing any program states. 
The program is executed under the control of a special scheduler, which systematically enumerates all 
execution paths of the program obtained by the nondeterministic choices. In other words, the scheduler 
controls the nondeterministic execution of threads. Existing stateless model checkers are execution-based 
(not model-based) so they execute programs in their runtime environments (or an emulated environment 
of real runtime environment) and explore the program state space by concretely executing. That is, the 
stateless model checker explores the state space of a program by repeating the process of executing the 
program with different scheduling choices. [10, 28, 29]. 
As this method is applied to the source code level, it is very similar to software testing. In fact, it is a 
systematic testing method. A stateless model checker systematically explores all possible interleavings of 
threads in the program under specific input for that program [30]. In terms of state space exploration, 
many techniques have been proposed in the area of stateless model checking so far, including dynamic 
partial order reduction [25], fair scheduling [10], symmetry reduction [26], distributed dynamic partial 
order reduction [23, 31], which make it possible for stateless model checkers to explore the meaningful 
part of the state space. All these techniques have proved the power of stateless model checking to verify 
large programs. 
In this paper, we take the approach proposed by Musuvathi and Qadeer [10] as fair stateless model 
checking. In this method, it is unexpected for a program not to terminate under a fair schedule. In other 
words, non-termination under fair scheduling is potentially an error. Our method is also applicable to 
programs that are expected to terminate under all fair schedules. However, these programs may not 
terminate under unfair schedules. Such programs are called fair-terminating [10].  
The concept of fair-terminating programs is based on the observation of the test harnesses for real-
world concurrent programs. Practically speaking, concurrent programs are combined with a suitable test 
harness that makes them fair-terminating when it comes to testing. By doing so, every thread in the 
program is eventually given a chance by the fair scheduler to make progress, which guarantees the 
(correct) program as a whole can make progress towards the end of the test. Such a test harness can be 
created even for systems such as cache-coherence protocols that are designed to “run forever”; the 
harness limits the number of cache requests from the external environment. 
Therefore, our method is applicable to a fair stateless model checker that has an explicit scheduler that 
is (strongly) fair and at the same time sufficiently nondeterministic to guarantee full coverage of safety 
properties. Such a fair scheduler has been implemented in the CHESS model checker [10, 17, 27] as well as 
DSCMC [32]. In this context, fairness is defined as follows: every thread that is enabled infinitely often 
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gets its turn infinitely often. 
It should be noted that stateless model checkers expect the program under test to eventually terminate. 
In other words, practically, it is not possible for a stateless model checker to identify or generate an 
infinite execution. They have some mechanism to deal with non-terminating programs [10, 19, 23, 27, 
30]. For example, they may ask the user to set a large bound on the execution depth. This bound can be 
orders of magnitude greater than the maximum number of steps the user expects the program to execute. 
The model checker stops if an execution exceeds the bound, and reports a warning to the user. The user 
can examine this execution to see whether it actually indicates an error. In the rare case it is not, the user 
simply increases the bound and runs the model checker again [10]. Above all, the stateless model 
checkers that do not apply the fair stateless model checking method, like Inspect [30, 33], are unable to 
properly verify the nonterminating programs that are fair-terminating. This is because they cannot detect 
existing cycles in the state space [10, 19, 30].  
The description of the fair stateless model checking algorithm is lengthy and complicated so we do not 
state it in this paper. However, we use this notion as part of our method. But, there is no need to state it in 
detail. When it comes to explaining our method, “fair state space exploration” represents the use of its 
related algorithm elaborated in [10].  
2.2. Program Model 
Transition systems are often used in computer science as models to describe the behavior of systems. 
They are directed graphs where nodes represent states and edges model transitions, i.e. state changes. A 
state describes some information about a system at a certain moment of its behavior. A state of a 
sequential computer program indicates the current values of all program variables together with the 
current value of the program counter that indicates the next program statement to be executed. We use 
transition systems with atomic propositions for the states. Atomic propositions (APs) intuitively express 
simple known facts about the states of the system under consideration [9]. The definitions proposed in 
this section are taken from [9]. 
Definition 1. A transition system TS is a tuple  (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) where S is a set of states, Act is a set 
of actions, →⊆ S × Act × S is a transition relation, I ⊆ S is a set of initial states, AP is a set of atomic 
propositions, and L : S → 2AP is a labeling function. 
Here, 2
AP
 denotes the power set of AP. For convenience, we write 's s
  instead of (s, α, s') ∈ →. 
The intuitive behavior of a transition system can be described as follows. The transition system starts in 
some initial state s0 ∈ I and evolves according to the transition relation →. That is, if s is the current 
state, then a transition 's s
 originating from s is selected non-deterministically and taken, i.e. the 
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action α is performed and the transition system evolves from state s into the state s'. This selection 
procedure is repeated in state s' and finishes once a state is encountered that has no outgoing transitions. 
For a sequential program, a program graph (PG) over a set of typed variables is a digraph whose edges 
are labeled with conditions on these variables and actions. Intuitively, a program graph is like the 
program control flow graph (CFG), in which executing an instruction changes the program state. 
Obviously, each sequential program has a program graph, which can be interpreted as a transition system 
[9]. After interpretation, states of the transition system are pairs of the form (l, η) where l is a program 
location and η denotes values of all the program variables in location l. For program P, the transition 
system of the program graph is denoted by TS (PG). 
A concurrent system is composed of a finite set of threads or processes whose state space is defined by 
using dynamic semantics in the style of transition systems. Each process executes a sequence of 
statements in a deterministic sequential programming language. Threads are a particular type of 
processes that share the same heap [25]. A multithreaded program can be modeled as a concurrent 
system, which consists of a finite set of threads, and a set of shared objects. Threads communicate with 
one another only through shared objects [26]. 
The transition system of a multithreaded program with n threads running in concurrent is defined as  
TS (PG1 ||| PG2 ||| … ||| PGn) where PGi is the program graph of i
th
 thread and ||| denotes the interleaving 
operator. Interleaving means the nondeterministic choice between activities of the simultaneously acting 
threads. 
Definition 2. Path: Let π = s0 s1 s2 … sn be a finite path of transition system TS, where si is a state of the 
transition system. A path is formed from a sequence of actions. Thus, π is formed from the execution of 
actions αj for j = 0, 1, 2, …,n such that 0 10 1 2...
n
ns s s s
     .  
Based on the explanation as to stateless model checking, we consider all paths of TS (PGp) as finite.  
Definition 3. Trace: We consider sequences of the form trace(π) = L(s0) L(s1) L(s2)… L(sn)  as traces of 
the transition system which register the (set of ) atomic propositions that are valid along the execution. 
L(si) is a function that returns a subset of atomic propositions of si.  
A path of s is a path started from s. Paths(s) is called the set of all the paths of s. Traces(s) is the set of 
traces of s.  It is supposed that Traces(s) = trace( Paths(s) ), where trace(π) is a function that maps path π 
to its corresponding trace. In the same way, Paths(TS) is a set of all the paths in TS, from which the set of 
traces in TS, Traces(TS), is obtained. 
When a program is executed, the execution is equal to a path of its state space (i.e. a path of TS(PG)). 
The previous section introduced the idea of stateless model checking. The algorithm of state space 
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exploration in stateless model checking is precisely described in [19, 29].  Intuitively, a stateless model 
checker explores the state space of a program by concretely and continuously re-executing the program 
such that the model checker generates a different thread scheduling scenario for each execution. We do 
not intend to elaborate the algorithms used in stateless model checking [23, 25, 27, 29] but it should be 
pointed out that the process of stateless model checking contains finite iterations. Each iteration is 
equivalent to the execution of program P under the control of its scheduler. 
Definition 4. Each execution of program P (i.e. each iteration of stateless model checking for P) is a path 
in the transition system of the program graph of P (i.e. a path in TS(PGP)).  
Definition 5. Stutter-equivalence of finite paths: let TSi = (Si, Acti, →i, Ii, AP, Li) be transition systems, 
Paths(TSi) is the set of finite paths in TSi , i = 1,2 , and πi ∈ Paths(TSi). Finite paths π1 in TS1 and π2 in 
TS2 are stutter equivalent, denoted π1  π2, if there exists a finite sequence A0 … An ∈ (2
AP
)
+
 such that 
trace(π1) and trace(π2) are contained in the language given by the regular expression A0
+
 A1
+
 … An
+
 . 
Here, the notation “+” matches the preceding element one or more times. The notion of stutter 
equivalence can be adapted to traces over the alphabet 2
AP
 in the obvious way. 
Definition 6. Stutter-equivalence of traces: traces σ1 and σ2 over 2
AP
 are stutter equivalent, denoted 
σ1  σ2, if they are both of the form A0
+
 A1
+
 … An
+
 for A0 … An ∈ (2
AP
)
+
. 
2.3. Observational Determinism 
Observational determinism is a generalization of non-interference that can be applied to multithreaded 
programs [22, 34].  As the concurrent programming languages are naturally nondeterministic, it is 
problematic to generalize non-interference to these languages; the language semantics does not specify 
the order of execution of concurrent threads. Even though the non-determinism permits a variety of 
thread scheduler implementations, it also leads to refinement attacks, in which information is leaked 
through resolution of either nondeterministic choices or scheduler choices [22]. The refinement attacks 
often exploit timing flows, covert channels that have been difficult to control [35]. Elimination of these 
attacks is possible by extending the non-interference with observational determinism [22]. This method 
avoids some of the restrictiveness imposed on security-typed concurrent languages [22, 34, 36].  
Intuitively, observational determinism expresses that a multithreaded program is secure when its 
publicly observable traces are independent of both its confidential data and its scheduling policy [22]. 
For observational determinism, several formal definitions have been proposed since 2003. Each 
definition has tried to improve the previous ones. This history is surveyed in [6, 37]. This paper is based 
on the definition of observational determinism proposed by Huisman et al. in 2011. Therefore, this 
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section states the definition that we use in our method. 
In a program with a multi-level security policy, it is generally assumed that there is a lattice Ł of 
security labels. The lattice elements describe restrictions on the propagation of information they label; 
the labels higher in the lattice describe data whose use is more restricted.  For the sake of simplicity, we 
consider a simple two-point security lattice, where the data is divided into two disjoint subsets H and L, 
containing the variables with high (i.e. private) and low (i.e. public) security level respectively. 
A store is the current state of a program memory mapping a value to the location of each program 
variable. Two stores s1 and s2 are equivalent if the values of all the variables in s1 and s2 are the same [6]. 
Definition 7. Stores s1 and s2 are low-equivalent, denoted s1  =L s2 iff the values of all variables in L in s1 
and s2 are the same; i.e. s1  =L s2  iff   s1|L = s2|L [6]. 
For example, suppose you have a program with two low locations (variables) l1 and l2. The low store 
for this program is a tuple of the form (l1.val, l2.val) where li.val denotes the value of variable li. Let the 
initial values for l1 and l2 be 0 then the initial low store is (0, 0). The low store changes during the 
program execution. For example, suppose l1 changes to 1, thereafter the low store changes to (1, 0), then 
if l1 changes to -1, the low store goes to state (-1, 0). Finally, when l2 changes to 2, the low store also 
changes to (-1, 2). Consequently, the low store trace in this example is a sequence of the form 
“(0, 0) (1, 0) (-1, 0) (-1, 2)”.  
Definition 8. The low store trace for trace σ is denoted by σ|L , which means we only consider low store 
values as the elements of AP. 
Definition 9. Given any two initial low equivalent stores, s1  =L s2 , program P is observationally 
deterministic iff any two low store traces of s1 and s2 are stutter equivalent, formally:   
∀ σ1, σ2, s1 =L s2,  σ1 ∈ Traces(s1), σ2 ∈ Traces(s2) ⇒ σ1|L   σ2|L [37]. 
Theorem 1. For any two initial low equivalent stores, if any two low store traces obtained from the 
execution of a program under a nondeterministic scheduler are stutter equivalent, this program is secure 
under any scheduling policy [37].
*
 
Corollary 1. By straightforward induction on Definition 9 and Theorem 1, program P is secure under 
any scheduling policy if it is observationally deterministic. 
                                                     
* The proof is available on [37]. 
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3. The Proposed Method 
This section elaborates how observational determinism can be verified with stateless code model 
checking. Our definition of observational determinism is formally stated in Section 2. This section 
proposes a new method for verifying this definition. First, we describe the main idea, and prove its 
soundness; next, the algorithm of the method is proposed. Then, an example is described to illustrate the 
algorithm. Finally, we discuss the soundness of the algorithm.  
3.1. Method 
All possible interleavings of threads (or processes) should be systematically explored by a model checker 
so model checking is normally free of any specified scheduling policy. That is, the scheduler of a 
stateless model checker attempts to generate enough schedules to achieve full state coverage. Therefore, 
it is appropriate to use Huisman’s scheduler-independent definition (Definition 9) for observational 
determinism.  Scheduler-independence means that if a program is secure under a security specification 
then an attacker cannot infer any secret information from it, regardless of which scheduler is used [6, 37]. 
Hereafter, we define some notations:  
1. SMC(P, s0) is a function of stateless model checking (i.e. fair state space exploration) for program 
P from initial states that are low equivalent to s0 such that SMC(P, s0)↪ Paths(s0), where ↪ is the 
notation of mapping in a function, and Paths(s0) ∈ Paths (TS(PGp)). That is to say, SMC(P, s0) 
generates all paths of s0. 
2. TS = (S, Act, →, I, AP, L) is the transition system of the program graph for program P (i.e. 
TS = TS(PGp)). 
3. AP is considered as a set of all possible values of the low store. 
4. 
0,j s
i denotes jth iteration of the stateless model checking process, which denotes the process is 
started from s0 ∈ I. 
5. 
0,j s
i ↪ πj, πj ∈ Paths(s0), Paths(s0)∈ Paths(TS(PGp)).That is, 
0,j s
i leads to the exploration of  πj. 
6. P* indicates that program P is secure under any scheduling policy. 
The proposed method assumes that the number of threads and initial states are finite. To verify (rather 
than test) observational determinism we use a new definition of stateless model checking, called 
complete stateless model checking (CSMC).  
Definition 10. CSMC: Let the initial low equivalent stores of program P be divided into n finite 
categories, n ≥ 1. CSMC for P, denoted CSMCP, n , is defined as a set of stateless model checking 
functions: CSMCP, n = ⋃ SMC (P, si) for i = 1, 2, …, n.   
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Theorem 2. low store traces of program P can be obtained from SMC (P, s0), denoted 
∀ 
0,j s
i ↪  σj|L , where  σj|L ∈ Traces(s0). 
Proof.  According to Section 2, each computer program, such as P, has a PG, from which TS(PGp) can be 
obtained. From Definition 3, each path can be mapped to a trace registering the atomic propositions that 
are valid along the execution. Definition 8 implies that σ|L = σ when AP is defined over the possible 
values of the low store. Consequently, 
0,j s
i ↪ π, π∈ Paths(s0) ∈ Paths(TS), from which a low store trace 
can be extracted. Considering the definition of SMC(P, s0) and Traces(s0), all low store traces obtained 
from the iterations belong to Traces(s0):  
∀ 
0,j s
i ↪  σj|L , σj|L ∈ Traces(s0), Traces(s0) ∈ Traces(TS(PGP)). 
According to Definition 9, if every pair of low store traces of initial low equivalent stores is stutter 
equivalent, P is secure. SMC(P, s0) considers only one sort of initial low equivalent stores, whereas we 
need to consider the whole initial low equivalent stores in order to verify observational determinism. As 
the definition of CSMC is aware of the condition, it explores traces of different sorts of initial low 
equivalent stores.  
Corollary 2. Program P is secure under any scheduling policy if for n = 1, 2, …, k, and k ≥ 1, 
∀ SMC(P, sn) ∈ CSMCP, k , ∀ σm’|L ,σm|L ∈ Traces(sn)⇒ σm’|L   σm|L  . 
Theorem 3. Program P is secure under any scheduling policy if each low store trace obtained from 
SMC(P, sx), 1≤ x ≤ k, conforms to the same regular expression, where k  is the size of set CSMCP, k: 
∀ σm’|L , σm|L ∈ Traces(sx) , A0 … An ∈ (2
AP
)
+
 σm’|L , σm|L  ∈ A0
+
 A1
+
 … An
+
 ⇒ P* 
Proof.  According to Corollary 1, P is secure under any scheduling policy if it is observationally 
deterministic. From Definition 9, a program is observationally deterministic iff the low store traces 
obtained from initial low equivalent stores are stutter equivalent. Following Theorem 2, SMC (P, s0) 
generates low store traces which belong to Traces(s0). Based on Definition 6, we can detect stutter 
equivalence of traces with a regular expression. Therefore, low store traces are stutter equivalent if they 
conform to the same regular expression. So based on Corollary 2, P is secure if each low store trace 
obtained from SMC(P, sx), 1≤ x ≤ k, conforms to the same regular expression.  
∀ σm’|L , σm|L ∈ Traces(sx) , A0 … An ∈ (2
AP
)
+
 , σm’|L , σm|L  ∈ A0
+
 A1
+
 … An
+
 ⇒ P* 
 
We call the regular expression related to SMC(P, sx) the pattern of secure low store traces (or secure 
pattern). Theorem 3 is used to verify observational determinism. Note that for ∀ m,n, 1 ≤ m,n ≤ k, the 
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secure pattern for the low store traces obtained from SMC(P, sm) can be different from the pattern for 
SMC(P, sn). In fact, Theorem 3 states all traces obtained from SMC(P, sx), 1≤ x ≤ k, must be stutter 
equivalent (conform to the same regular expression) if program P is secure. 
3.2.  Algorithm 
According to the previous subsection, if all low store traces generated in SMC(P, sn) are stutter 
equivalent, the program in that part of state space pertaining to SMC(P, sn) is secure. If there is at least 
one low store trace which is not stutter equivalent with others, that low store trace does not conform to 
the secure pattern and the program violates the security policy. 
Let us illustrate the forgoing with a simple example; consider a program, P, with two low locations l1 
and l2, that are Boolean with initial values of 0. Suppose we are performing SMC(P, sn); at runtime, 
whenever either l1 or l2 is defined, its new value after definition is immediately monitored by the model 
checker. If the new value of the location recently redefined differs from its previous value, a state change 
of the low location has occurred.  Suppose the program is executed such that a sequence of the form 
“(0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1)” is obtained as its low store trace; this sequence denotes that the program was 
executed such that first, l2 changed to 1, next, l1 changed to 1. According to Theorem 3, all the low store 
traces obtained from SMC(P, sn) are expected to be contained in the language given by the regular 
expression “(0, 0)+ (0, 1)+ (1, 1)+” if the program is secure. 
We describe an algorithm for detecting observational determinism, which is used in SMC(P, sn) 
1 ≤ n ≤ k. For SMC(P, sn), after ending each iteration of stateless model checking, the model checker 
should run another iteration. After ending SMC(P, sn), the model checker also should run SMC(P, sn+1). 
Fig. 1 shows the algorithm of CSMCP,k . In this algorithm, variable end_of_prog denotes whether the 
current iteration of stateless model checking ends or not. At the end of each iteration, this variable will be 
set. Variable result shows the result of verification. 
In order to ensure information flow security, a pattern of low store traces (a regular expression) is 
made in 1, nsi , and all the traces obtained from SMC(P, sn) are expected to match the pattern. We can 
dynamically check whether the trace of the current execution is stutter equivalent to other traces obtained 
from SMC(P, sn) or not. Our algorithm is based on state changes of the low store in the current iteration. 
The process of verifying observational determinism in each SMC(P, sn) is divided into two phases: 
(1) detecting the pattern and saving it as a retrievable signature (2) checking whether the low store traces 
are stuttering equivalent (i.e. conform to the signature). This section presents the pseudo-code of the 
algorithms used in each phase. The algorithm for the first phase is shown in Fig. 2. This algorithm is used 
in 1, nsi of stateless model checking. Fig. 3 shows the algorithm used in the second phase, used for ∀ , ni si , 
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i ≥ 2. Therefore, the main body of this algorithm (lines 3-19 of Fig. 3) is repeated for each , ni si , i ≥ 2.  
In these algorithms, DETS [38] is a kind of hash table whereby data records are saved on the disk, 
which is an efficient storage mechanism. Variable lssc is a counter that shows the number of low store 
state changes. It is obvious that this number for the above example should be 3. We use this counter for 
saving the pattern as a retrievable concise signature. Moreover, with the help of this counter, traces 
stutter equivalence is detected dynamically.  
 
Fig. 1  The algorithm of CSMCP,k  
1. Let P have k sorts of initial low equivalent stores: s0,…, sk 
2. Let Path(si) be the set of paths of si 
3. boolean end_of_prog = false   // Shared variable 
4. boolean result = false        // Shared variable 
5. sem result_IFS = 0            // Binary semaphore 
 
6.  boolean CSMC(P, s0, …, sk) 
7.    boolean result_smc 
8.    For i = 1 to i = k 
9.     result_smc = SMC(P, si) 
10.        If ! result_smc  
                 // A security violation was detected 
11.          Return false             // The end of CSMCP,k 
12.        End-if 
13.   End-for  
14. Return true         // P is secure ---- The end of CSMCP,k 
 
15. boolean SMC(P, si) 
16.  Spawn IFS_first_itr ( ) 
17.  Spawn Fair_state_exp (P, si) 
18.  Wait result_IFS 
19.  If ! result  
20.     Kill Fair_state_exp 
21.     Return false              // A security violation was detected       
22.  End-if 
23. Return true 
 
24. void Fair_state_exp (P, si) 
   /* Begin fair state space exploration   
      * It continues until all paths of Path(si) have been explored  
    */ 
25.  While Path(si) ≠ ∅  
26.    Execute P under the fair scheduler 
27.    Explore π                  // π ∈ Path(si): π is the path obtained from the current execution of P 
28.    When P comes to an end  // Current execution of P ends: the end of the current iteration 
29.      end_of_prog = true 
30.      Path(si) = Path(si) – π    // Remove π from Path(si) 
31.    End-when 
32.  End-while 
33. Return 
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When a low location changes, we use data structure LS to save its information on the DETS table, 
where LS.id is the identifier of the low location that has caused the low store state to change, LS.val is the 
new value of that low location, and LS.num denotes the current value of lssc. At the implementation 
level, there should be a mechanism for detecting the memory locations of the variables; here, we assume 
the variables are distinguished by identifiers (i.e. LS.id). Also, aliasing of low variables may need to be 
dynamically detected at implementation. 
At first, the stateless model checker starts the process of model checking with function CSMC, line 6 
of Fig. 1. This function calls function SMC for each sn. Function SMC creates two other processes in 
lines 16-17; one of them executes the fair stateless model checking algorithm [10] (lines 24-33) although 
it embodies the algorithm as a black box in lines 26-27. Another process is responsible for verifying 
observational determinism, which is called ifsv. These processes run in concurrent interacting each other. 
After creating the above processes, line 18, function SMC waits for receiving a signal from the process 
verifying observational determinism. When it receives the signal for semaphore result_IFS, it checks the 
result of the verification using variable result on line 19. If the variable is true then the part of the state 
space related to SMC(P, sn) is secure. Otherwise, a security violation has been detected and SMC returns 
false to CSMC at line 21. Function CSMC receives this return value on line 9. If it is true then CSMC sets 
up SMC(P, sn+1). Otherwise, it finds a violation and ends the process of verification (lines 10-12). 
We assume that program P is repeatedly executed under the control of the stateless model checker to 
perform SMC(P, sn), and the tool is able to identify low locations at runtime (in each iteration). In each 
iteration , after initializing a low location, such as l (l ∈  L), whenever the low location is redefined*, if its 
new value varies from the previous one, ifsv is able to capture this state change of that low location (Fig. 
2, line 4, and Fig. 3, line 5). When a low location changes to a new value, it causes the low store to 
change to a new state. 
Our algorithm does not need to save all values of variables during the state change of the low store 
(unlike stateful model checking). As is clear from the above example, only the value of one low variable 
(low location) changes in each state change of the low store. Therefore, we only need to know the 
location that has caused the state change of the low store, as well as its new value. In other words, it 
suffices to store id and value of that location along with a number that represents how many times the 
low store has changed. Note that using this idea, we only store a pattern of state changes of the low store 
in 1, nsi (in order to dynamically construct the signature for other iterations after 1, nsi ). That is, the pattern 
is saved at 1, nsi by the algorithm in Fig. 2. In subsequent iterations, there is no need to store any states. It 
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is enough to monitor the low store state at runtime, and compare it with the signature (Fig. 3). 
For 1, nsi , the instructions at lines 3-10 of Fig. 2 are executed as long as the program has not terminated. 
When a low location (such as l) changes to a new value (such as newval), ifsv catches this state change at 
line 4. Therefore, variable lssc is incremented (line 5), and then the identifier of l, its new value, and the 
current value of lssc are saved in the record LS (lines 6-8). The record is saved in the DETS table with 
key lssc at line 9. This procedure continues until the end of 1, nsi . 
After ending the first iteration, the number of state changes of the low store (i.e. lssc) is saved on the 
DETS at line 13, and now, the DETS contains the signature that low store traces should conform to. 
Thereafter, the model checker advances the model checking process by re-executing the program to 
explore another path (line 25 of Fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 2  The algorithm of extracting the pattern of low store traces for SMC(P, sn)  
After 1, nsi , the algorithm shown in Fig. 3 is used until the end of SMC(P, sn). The process ends when all 
execution paths obtained from threads interleaving have been explored. At last, function IFS returns 
either true or false to function IFS_first_itr, and the IFS_first_itr function saves its verification result 
into variable result signaling to SMC that it is time to terminate SMC(P, sn) (lines 14-15 of Fig. 2). SMC 
receives the signal at line 18 of Fig. 1. 
For ∀ , ni si , i ≥ 2, when a low location such as l changes to a new value such as newval causes the low 
store to change. The state change is captured by ifsv (Fig. 3, line 5). Therefore, the record with key 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
* In compiler science, it is said that a location (or variable) is defined (or redefined) when a write access to that memory location takes place. 
1.  void IFS_first_itr( ) 
   // P is executing under the stateless model checker  
2.   lssc = 0 
3.   While ! end_of_prog   
4.     When l ∈  L is defined to newval 
5.      lssc += 1    
6.      LS.id = l.id 
7.      LS.val = newval 
8.      LS.num = lssc 
9.      Save the LS on the DETS with key LS.num  
10.    End-when 
11.  End-while 
12.  end_of_prog = false 
13.  Save the lssc on the DETS 
14.  result = IFS( ) 
15.  Signal result_IFS 
16.  Return 
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“lssc + 1” is fetched from the DETS, and saved in variable temp (Fig. 3, line 6), which represents the 
low location that caused the state change of the low store in the signature. If both identifier and value of 
the variable in the retrieved record (temp.id and temp.val) are equal to id and newval (line 7), the state 
change is accepted; otherwise, a security violation is revealed (lines 10-12). In the former case, lssc is 
incremented, and ifsv goes on monitoring. After ending each iteration, the current value of counter lssc 
should be checked to be equal to the number of the state changes of the low store in the signature (lines 
16-19). If they are not equal, it represents a security violation. The reason for doing this is that Definition 
9 does not allow low store traces to be stutter and prefix equivalent [6], hence the number of changes of 
the low store in all traces should be equal if the program is secure. 
 
 
Fig. 3 The algorithm to check stutter-equivalence of traces SMC(P, sn)  
3.3. Discussion on Complexity 
Our method needs to save only a short signature (in comparison with a trace) on the disk. The algorithm 
removes all redundancies during storage of the signature and pattern matching.  Only in the first iteration, 
the signature is constructed based on state changes of individual low locations, instead of state changes 
1.  boolean IFS( ) 
2.    Foreach iteration in SMC(P, si) 
3.     lssc = 0 
4.     While ! end_of_prog  
5.       When l ∈  L is defined to newval 
6.                Fetch the tuple with key “lssc + 1” and Save it in temp 
7.          If temp.id == l.id && temp.val == newval 
8.                lssc += 1    
9.               End-if 
10.             Else   
11.            Return false      //A security violation occurred 
12.               End-else 
13.           End-when 
14.     End-while 
15.    end_of_prog = false 
16.    Fetch lssc from the DETS and Save it in stn 
17.        If stn != lssc 
18.             Return false          //A security violation occurred 
19.        End-if   
     /* Else  
      *      The verification process continues for another iteration 
      *      Go to the beginning of the Foreach loop 
      */        
20.   End-foreach 
21. Return true 
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of the low store (low store = all the low locations). Fig. 4 illustrates how to save the state changes of the 
low store. The algorithm of Fig. 3 only examines the current low store in the main memory without 
capturing the program state space. Using the signature, the regular expression expected to be the secure 
pattern is constructed on-the-fly and gradually as stutter equivalence is being verified dynamically. The 
example in section 3.3 illustrates how to do that. To sum up, as far as the main memory is concerned, no 
state is saved and the algorithm needs only simple variables which were described. However, as you can 
see, the number of the records saved on the disk increases in the number of the state changes of the low 
store. 
 
 
Fig. 4 An example of storing the signature 
Please note that the algorithm in Fig. 1 stands for the same stateless model checking algorithm. This 
technique can be really time-consuming for complicated and large programs. One the positive side, 
stateless model checking does not face state space explosion and its capability to cope with real-world 
concurrent programs has been proved in practice. Therefore, when it comes to time complexity of the 
method, we consider our own algorithms in Fig. 2 and 3. As described, these algorithms are event-based; 
this fact is represented with the While loop in these algorithms. Also, the Foreach loop in Fig. 3 is related 
to iterations of stateless model checking. In fact, each iteration itself contains the While loop which 
captures value changes of low variables. Whenever the value of a low location changes, the algorithm 
needs some simple read and write actions. Thus, the time complexity of this algorithm is linear in the 
number of such changes.  
The next subsection is a simple example to illustrate the algorithm. When it has been clarified how the 
algorithm works, we discuss its soundness. 
3.4. Example 
Consider the following program, P, where h ∈ High and l1, l2 ∈ Low (the low store of this program is a 
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couple of the form (l1.val, l2.val)). 
l1 := 0; l2 := 0; h = 0; 
{{if (l1 == 1) then (l2 := h) else skip} ||| l1 := 1  ||| h := 1;} 
 
This program is not secure because the value of h can be revealed through observing low store traces. 
A hacker who sees l2 is always 0 can infer h = 1 when the program terminates in a state where l2 = 1. As 
s0 = (0, 0) is the initial low store, and there is only one sort of initial low equivalent stores (s0 is always 
(0, 0)), so we have CSMCP, 1. Therefore, we only need to describe SMC(P, s0). 
Let Ti be a thread in the above program where T1 is the left-most side of the interleaving operator and 
T3 is the right-most side of the operator. All the possible low store traces of the program, obtained from 
executing P under different scheduling policies (or it is better to say obtained from SMC(P, s0)), are as 
follows: 
1. Execute T1, T2, T3: σ|L = [(0, 0) (1, 0)] 
2. Execute T1, T3, T2: σ|L = [(0, 0) (1, 0)] 
3. Execute T2, T1, T3: σ|L = [(0, 0) (1, 0) (1, 0)] 
4. Execute T3, T1, T2: σ|L = [(0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 0)] 
5. Execute T2, T3, T1: σ|L = [(0, 0) (1, 0) (1, 1)] 
6. Execute T3, T2, T1: σ|L = [(0, 0) (1, 0) (1, 1)] 
As can be seen in the above low store traces, the traces are not stutter equivalent. Therefore, the 
program is not observationally deterministic and according to Corollary 1, the program is not secure. 
Now let us follow the algorithm for this example.  Initially, function CSMC calls SMC(P, s0) at line 9, 
Fig. 1.  Therefore, it starts the process of stateless model checking; first, the variables are initialized by 
the program. Then, suppose the model checker first schedules T1, next, T2.  When T2 is scheduled, it 
changes low location l1 into 1, which causes the low store to go from state (0, 0) to state (1, 0). 
Therefore, the first state change of the low store occurs. The ifsv catches this event at line 4 in Fig. 2. 
consequently, a tuple of the form {1, 1, 1} is inserted into the DETS (Fig.2, line 9), where from the left 
side, the first 1 denotes this is the first sate change of the low store (LS.num), the second 1 denotes the 
identifier of the location that caused the state change (i.e. LS.id; here, we supposed the identifier of l1 is 
1), and the third 1 is the new value of id after the state change (LS.val). Thereafter, the model checker 
schedules T3, and the program ends. Through this execution, ifsv considers the regular expression of the 
low store traces to be “(0, 0)+ (1, 0)+”, and the value of the counter lssc to be 1. 
After 
01,s
i , the IFS_first_itr function calls IFS at line 14 of Fig. 2. After initialization in 
02,s
i , suppose 
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that the model checker first schedules T1, next, T3, and finally, T2. When T2 is scheduled, l1 changes to a 
new value (l1:= 1). This situation shows the first state change of the low store occurred (i.e. lssc changes 
to 1). The ifsv catches the event at line 5 of Fig. 3. It should examine whether the state change conforms 
to the signature or not. For this reason, it fetches the record of the first low store state change from the 
DETS (i.e. the record with key 1) at line 6, then checks that both identifiers and values of the variables 
that cause the state change in the current situation and in the signature are the same. As both conditions 
are true in this example, the statements on lines 7-9 are executed. Then, the program ends, and the 
algorithm compares the current value of lssc with its value in the signature (lines 16-19). Due to the 
equality of the two values (both values are 1), this iteration also ends successfully. 
Suppose the model checker schedules threads such that the third iteration conforms to low store trace 
3. Therefore, this iteration ends successfully too. Thereafter, 
04,s
i ends similarly. Let  
05,s
i  correspond to 
low store trace 5. A security violation will occur when T1 is scheduled. Because when l2 changes to 1, 
ifsv sees the number of the state changes in the current execution exceeds the number of the state changes 
in the signature (i.e. lssc != stn - line 17); therefore, an existing security violation is detected, and IFS 
returns false at line 18 of Fig. 3, consequently function SMC(P,s0) also returns false at line 21 of Fig. 1. 
Then CSMC receives false at line 9 of Fig. 1 and returns false at line 11. 
When CSMC returns, the process of model checking comes to an end. If its return value is true, it 
shows the program under test is secure. Otherwise, it has detected a security flaw in the program. 
3.5. Soundness 
First of all, let us introduce some notations. Let program P have n low locations. Therefore, its low store 
is a tuple like (l0, …, li1, …, li2, …, lij,…, ln). In the low store, the place of location lik in relation to the 
place of location lij has no matter. That is, j ≤ k or j ≥ k; e.g. for locations li1 and li2, no matter whether 
the low store is (l0, …, li1, …, li2, …, lij,…, ln) or (l0, …, li2, …, li1, …, lij,…, ln). But, for the sake of 
simplicity, we suppose the low store is a tuple of the form (l0, …, li1, …, li2, …, lij,…, ln). However, in 
the following description, notations lij and lik can even be the representative of the same place. To recap, 
the ifsv algorithm exploits this fact that only one low location has changed in each state change of the 
low store. Theorem 4 proves the soundness of the algorithm. 
Theorem 4. The algorithm holds two features: (1) it truly extracts the pattern; i.e. the correct regular 
expression can be reconstructed, and (2) it truly detects stutter equivalence of traces. 
Proof. In regard to the first feature, we do the proof by induction. We should prove that by having tuples 
(1, li1, Xi1) (2, li2, Xi2)…(n, lij, Xij), we are able to construct the following regular expression:  
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(l0, …, li1, …, li2, …, lij,…, ln)
+ 
 (l0, …, Xi1, …, li2, …, lij,…, ln)
+  (l0, …, Xi1, …, Xi2, …, lij,…, ln)
+…  
(l0, …, Xi1, …, Xi2, …, Xij,…, ln)
+
. The base case is when the low store state only changes once. We have 
the initial low store so the tuple (1, li1, Xi1) shows that, in the first state change, location li1 changes to 
Xi1. Therefore, we can find out that the low store after the first state change is (l0, …, Xi1, …, li2, …, lij,…, 
ln). Needless to say, low locations can be redefined, but their value may remain unchanged. Hence, a 
state of the low store like (l0, …, Xi1, …, li2, …, lij,…, ln) can stay unchanged even after a (some) low 
location(s) has (have) been defined. Consequently, repetition, “+”, may occur. In the inductive step, we 
assume that the feature holds after k state changes of the low store. Therefore, we have tuples 
(1, li1, Xi1) (2, li2, Xi2)…(n, lik, Xik), and are able to construct the regular expression 
(l0, …, li1, …, li2, …, lij,…, ln)
+ 
 (l0, …, Xi1, …, li2, …, lij,…, ln)
+  (l0, …, Xi1, …, Xi2, …, lij,…, ln)
+…  
(l0, …, Xi1, …, Xi2, …, Xik,…, ln)
+
. So, from this step, we know the low store is like (l0, …, Xi1, …, Xi2, 
…, Xik,…,  ln) after k state changes. Then, we need to show that after (k+1) state changes, we can 
construct (l0, …, li1, …, li2, …, lij,…, ln)
+ 
 (l0, …, Xi1, …, li2, …, lij,…, ln)
+  (l0, …, Xi1, …, Xi2, …, lij,…, 
ln)
+… (l0, …, Xi1, …, Xi2, …, Xik,…, ln)
+
 (l0, …, Xi1, …, Xi2, …, Xik,…, Xik+1,…,  ln)
+
. When we have the 
tuple (k+1, lik+1, Xik+1) then, using key k+1, the algorithm detects that low store (l0, …, Xi1, …, Xi2, …, 
Xik,…, ln) has turned into (l0, …, Xi1, …, Xi2, …, Xik,…, Xik+1,…,  ln). Therefore, as the algorithm saves 
tuples (1, li1, Xi1) (2, li2, Xi2)… (j, lik, Xik), (j, lik+1, Xik+1),  it is able to exactly construct its corresponding 
regular expression.   
For the second feature, we should prove that, during reconstruction of the regular expression, the 
algorithm is able to detect whether the current trace violates the pattern. That is to say, the algorithm 
should detect traces stutter equivalence correctly. Suppose that the current trace is not stutter equivalent 
to the other traces. So it should generate a different regular expression based on Definition 6. In light of 
the above explanation as to the first feature, suppose the first inconsistency in the current trace appears 
while the algorithm is reconstructing k
th
 word of the regular expression. Therefore, when ifsv fetches 
(k, lik, Xik), it expects k
th
 state change in the current trace to be brought about when lik changed to Xik. If 
this has not happened then it should detect the violation. As can be seen in Fig 3, on lines 7-13 the ifsv 
algorithm is able to do so exactly. 
4. Discussion and Related Work 
There are several mechanisms for enforcing and checking information flow security policies (IFS) in 
computer programs. Static techniques are conventional solutions in the field. Dynamic techniques are 
other solutions that are more precise and costly [39]. Language-based techniques are one strong approach 
for enforcing and verifying IFS, whose main idea is to design and implement programming languages 
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that would be inherently secure. For instance, JIF [40] and Jeddak [39] are two such languages, which are 
extensions of Java. Although this approach is advancing, it is specific to particular programming 
languages being inapplicable to the legacy code. 
Another approach in language-based techniques is to analyze the program source code to discover 
security leaks [41]. But many of these analyses are imprecise, resulting in false alarms because they are 
not flow-sensitive, context-sensitive, or object-sensitive. However, Hummer et al. [41, 42] have tried to 
compensate for this problem. Generally, some approaches to program analysis, such as precise inter-
procedural, dataflow analysis, and program slicing, are alternatives to verification techniques (e.g., model 
checking). 
There is a lot of work based on type systems and compiler techniques in the field though type systems 
are so inflexible that changing their security policies is an arduous task [2, 34]. Recently, some type 
systems have been proposed to address dynamic issues of concurrent programs and enforce 
confidentiality in multithreaded programs. They often aim to prevent the disclosure of secret information 
brought about by the thread timing behavior of a program, i.e. secret information cannot be derived from 
observing the internal timing of actions. Therefore, these type systems are often very restrictive, which 
makes programming rather impractical [6, 22]. One of the difficulties in verifying IFS for multithreaded 
programs is non-deterministic thread scheduling. The fact that a program is secure under a particular 
scheduler does not imply that it is secure under another scheduler [6, 7]. 
Some work has tried to specify information flow security as a safety property so as to be able to verify 
that property with existing verification methods. Francesco et al. [2, 5] characterized IFS in 
computational tree logic (CTL) using an early restrictive definition of non-interference. Boudol [43] 
specified a safety property for IFS that it could be used in type systems. Terauchi and Aiken [44] 
transformed the verification of IFS to a safety problem using self-composition concepts [45]. However, 
most such work concentrated on sequential programs.  
Type-based approach is insensitive to control flow and rejects many secure programs. Therefore, 
recently, self-composition [45, 46] has been advocated as a way to transform the verification of 
information flow properties into a standard program verification problem (such as [6, 7, 44]). A common 
solution to the verification problem is to use model checking techniques. Sun et al.  [12] proposed a 
method for model checking information flow for an imperative language however concurrency issues 
were not addressed in their work either. In their method, the model was characterized with a pushdown 
system. They used a semantic-based approach by self-composing symbolic pushdown system and 
specified non-interference property with linear-temporal logic (LTL) formula. Then, the LTL-expressed 
property verified with the Moped model checker [47].  
Most of the related work [44, 45, 48] only considered the input-output behavior of programs while 
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defining the non-interference property, which is not appropriate for multithreaded programs. Huisman et 
al. [34] characterized the non-interference property in CTL* (an extension of CTL [9]). The 
characterization considered the whole execution traces and thus amended the foregoing. Although their 
approach is suitable for multithreaded programs, they suggested using conventional model checking and 
self-composition to verify the characterization [7]. However, there is not a ready-made model checker to 
verify CTL* properties [7, 34]. 
Most of the previous work using model checking to verify IFS, such as [2, 5, 7, 12, 49], applied 
conventional model checking; all of them used stateful model checking and rarely applied code model 
checking. Unno et al. [49] took a fairly different approach among the work. Their method is a 
combination of type-based analysis and model checking; suspicious execution paths, which might cause 
insecure information flow, were firstly found by using the result of a type-based information flow 
analysis, and then a model checker was employed to check if the paths were indeed unsafe. However, 
they also used conventional model checking and did not consider concurrency issues. 
In the literature, different definitions of confidentiality have been proposed for multithreaded 
programs. In 1995, Roscoe [21] stated the behavior of a program that can be observed by an attacker 
should be deterministic. To capture this formally, Zdancewic and Myers [22] introduced the notion of 
observational determinism in 2003. They introduced observational determinism as a scheduler 
independent notion of security for concurrent programs [36]. In fact, they proposed the first formal 
definition of observational determinism. Some research papers, such as [6, 34, 49], tried to amend 
Zdancewic’s definition since then. Here, we mention some existing definitions of observational 
determinism in the following. For a more detailed discussion, please see [6]. 
Given any two initial low equivalent stores, s1  =L s2 , a program P is observationally deterministic, 
according to: 
• Huisman et al. [34]: iff any two low location traces are stutter equivalent (2006, scheduler-
independent definition). 
• Huisman et al. [6]: iff (1) any two low location traces should be stutter equivalent and (2) given a 
low store trace starting in store s1, for any low equivalent store s2 there exists a low store trace 
starting in s2 such that these traces are stutter equivalent (2011, scheduler-specific definition). 
• Huisman et al. [37]: iff any two low store traces are stutter equivalent (2011, scheduler-
independent definition). 
The authors used conventional model checking to verify the above properties. The main hurdle is that 
conventional model checkers run into state space explosion. Therefore, it is required to improve model 
checking algorithms for the specific need of the observational determinism property. In addition, they did 
not use code model checking techniques and suggested using model-based techniques. 
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In addition, when it comes to using model checking as a verification method, observational 
determinism has usually been verified by employing self-composition [45]. From the security literature it 
is known how to transform the problem of checking observational determinism on a single program to the 
problem of checking a safety property on two copies of the program running in parallel (self-
composition). The idea presented in this paper is that for checking observational determinism on single 
traces. It suffices to compare the output of that trace to the unique sequence of outputs of the program 
(which could be extracted from the first program run). Thus, unlike the descriptions in [6, 7, 37, 44, 45], 
we do not have to consider pairs of program runs, but only single runs, which will indeed simplify the 
checking process significantly.   
In more recent work, Ngo et al. [1, 50] proposed a verification method for observational determinism. 
In [1], authors have presented a model checking algorithm for probabilistic programs, which aims to 
verify the scheduler-specific definition of observational determinism. As the verification of observational 
determinism in [6, 37] is rather complex and cannot be handled efficiently by the existing conventional 
model checkers, authors in [1, 50] proposed algorithms to verify a modified version of the definition of 
observational determinism. Their approach is parameterized by a particular scheduling policy, thus it can 
be checked whether the program will be secure under a particular scheduling policy. If the scheduling 
policy changes, the property has to be re-established for this new scheduling policy. It thus only gives a 
guarantee for a particular scheduling policy. In [50], authors used symbolic model checking to verify 
observational determinism. Symbolic model checking is also a powerful tool for verifying concurrent 
programs. But, our approach is quite different while utilizing the power of stateless code model checking. 
Even so, it would be an interesting future work to combine both stateless model checking and symbolic 
model checking to verify observational determinism in large and complex programs. 
It should be pointed out that there are also other approaches to defining observational determinism. For 
example, recently, in [51] an alternative definition for observational determinism and its verification has 
been proposed. The proposed verification method makes use of program dependence graphs to check 
observational determinism. The proposed definition of observational determinism is also analogous to the 
scheduler-independent definition of observational determinism. But, in [51], instead of considering low 
values, the trace definition is based on low operations (read or write on a low variable). In terms of time 
complexity, this method has a rather high time complexity (O(n
3
)). 
It is fairly inexpensive to detect stutter equivalence of traces and check observational determinism by 
stateless model checking (in comparison with stateful model checking). To check observational 
determinism, stateful model checkers need to capture all the reachable states of the program, and 
compare every pair of traces as well as each trace with all the other traces. For this reason, they face the 
state space explosion problem. From one point of view, this paper proposes an algorithm for detecting 
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stutter equivalence of traces in stateless model checking as well. In our method, it is enough to save only 
one pattern of state changes of low locations, and then stutter equivalence is dynamically computed 
during stateless model checking iterations. By using the method, we can detect observational 
determinism with stateless code model checking for the first time. 
As systematic path exploration in stateless model checking is time-intensive, the verification problem 
will probably transform to systematical testing while verifying observational determinism in large 
programs. However, if we perform distributed stateless model checking, we may be able to cope with the 
problem. Apart from being a systematic and automatic security testing, this method is more applicable 
than conventional model checking to the verification (testing) of observational determinism. There are 
some serious problems using conventional model checking, including code modeling and state space 
explosion.  
Conventional model checkers are state-based and need to store at least part of the program state space. 
Even for a simple program with just a small number of variables, the state space can be rather extreme. 
For instance, a program with ten locations, three Boolean variables and five bounded integers (with 
domain in {0,...,9}) has 10×2
3
×10
5 
= 8,000,000 states. If a single bit array of 50 bits is added to
 
this 
program, for example, this bound grows even to 800,000×2
50
! This observation
 
clarifies why the 
verification of data-intensive programs (with many variables or complex domains) is extremely hard. 
Even if there are only a few variables in a program, the
 
state space that must be analyzed may be very 
large [9]. Hence, it may be impractical to even check observational determinism with conventional model 
checkers. In fact, stateless model checking is a systematic testing suited to explore the state space of the 
large programs whose state space exploration is impractical using state-based methods.  
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper proposes a new verification method for ensuring confidentiality in multithreaded programs. In 
the literature, different definitions of confidentiality have been proposed for multithreaded programs. We 
follow the approach advocated by Roscoe [21], which states that the behavior which can be observed by 
an attacker should be deterministic. Observational determinism is one of the most powerful properties for 
ensuring information flow security in multithreaded programs. There is plenty of work on formalizing 
observational determinism as a (safety) property, which aims to convert the verification of observational 
determinism into a standard program verification problem, and use (conventional) model checkers. But, 
this paper proposes a new verification method for observational determinism based on stateless code 
model checking. 
As yet, all model checking techniques used to verify IFS (such as [2, 5, 7, 12, 49]) fall into the 
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category of conventional techniques; As they are state-based, they suffer from the state space explosion 
problem. Some of conventional model checkers are model-based and expect users to manually model 
their systems. So the validity of the verification result relies on that model, hence it is necessary that the 
input model conform to the target code. However, modeling is a costly process that requires special 
background knowledge and skill. Besides, there is a big conceptual gap between programming and 
modeling languages that makes modeling real-world programs more difficult.  
Stateless model checking is a time-intensive process due to running the program concretely and 
exploring its entire execution paths. Hence, the applicability of the proposed method is highly dependent 
on its implementation. In the worst case, we can use the method for security testing or debugging.  
However, implementing the presented method in a parallel and distributed model checker indeed plays an 
important part in reduction of the verification cost. As the cycles of functions CSMC and SMC (Fig. 1) 
are independent, it is possible to distribute them among several computational nodes so that we can 
reduce verification time, and increase coverage of the state space. The advantage of distributed stateless 
model checking over distributed stateful model checking is that the stateless approach needs much less 
memory management efforts. Currently, we are implementing our method in a new parallel and 
distributed stateless model checker, DSCMC [32]. 
Our method assumes that the initial values of high variables are changed in each iteration of stateless 
model checking; because many security violations are revealed provided that the initial values of high 
variables change. At the implementation level, different methods may be applied to fulfill this need. As a 
whole, in (stateless) model checking, precisely handling non-deterministic input may be impractical for 
large programs without using symbolic techniques. Then practically speaking, our method is likely to be 
transformed to systematically testing. But this is kind of security testing automatically performed with 
the awareness of information flow control. To remedy the problem, the method must be improved by 
combining with test generation techniques (such as white-box fuzz testing [52] and symbolic execution 
[53]) to cover more execution paths. The method proposed by Godefroid et al. in [52, 54] can be 
effective for this purpose. 
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